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Studies of software piracy have usually been based on self-report data. Self-report data on ethical beliefs 
and behaviors are susceptible to social desirability bias. An experimental study is proposed in which 
subjects are given the opportunity to acquire software either from an authorized website at a legal price, 
or from a pirate source free of cost. In the study, actual money is at stake, reducing the possibility of self-
report bias. The experimental design used by Gino, Ayal, and Ariely (2009) is adapted to study the effects 
of three antecedents (salience, deterrence, and social influence) on software piracy. In the current article, 
the theoretical bases of the study, and the proposed experiment, are described. It is anticipated that the 
authors will be able to present preliminary data and analysis at the conference.  
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Introduction 
The extent of software piracy continues to be of major concern to software publishers. While there is a 
significant body of research attempting to identify reasons why individuals pirate, a coherent 
understanding of the motivations underlying software piracy has yet to emerge. One concern with results 
reported by past researchers is the likelihood of social desirability bias (Chung and Monroe 2003; Paulhus 
2002). A program of research to understand the role of social desirability bias and to simultaneously gain 
a better understanding of the antecedents of software piracy is being undertaken. The study being 
described in the current article is a part of the overall effort. 
The first aim of the proposed study is to reduce or eliminate social desirability bias in the data gathering 
process. This is accomplished by placing actual money at stake. The second aim is to understand the 
effects of some key antecedents. The choice of antecedents was driven by published literature in ethics 
and software piracy. For instance, (Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2009) have shown that salience of ethicality, 
deterrence, and social influence affect ethical behavior. The issue of salience of ethicality has not received 
any attention in software piracy, but is considered important in ethical research (Gino et al. 2009; Mazar, 
Amir, and Ariely 2008; Vohs and Schooler 2008). The role of deterrence has received much attention, but 
results have been conflicting. For instance, Konstantakis, Palaigeorgiou, Siozos, and Tsoukalas (2010) 
deem that most users pay little attention to laws, finding them unrealistic and inapplicable, while Moores, 
Nill, and Rothenberger (2009) argue that the fear of legal ramifications is the primary motivating factor 
against an individual’s attitude towards piracy. The role of social norms has been demonstrated by Cheng, 
Sims, and Teegen (1997), who found that ‘most people I know copy software’ was ranked highly in factors 
explaining why individuals pirate software. However, the effect of social influence itself has not been 
examined. Essentially, the proposed study plans to use a method heretofore untested in software piracy, 
to examine the effects of three key antecedents shown to be important in software piracy and ethics 
research. 
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In view of space limitations, the article combines the customary sections of literature review, and theory 
and hypotheses into a single section entitled ‘Theory and Hypotheses.’ The literature review is limited to 
such research as is needed to support the hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the experimental 
details, to highlight the use of actual money in a software piracy study, and concluding remarks. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
In the current section, literature is reviewed to provide theoretical support for the hypotheses that will be 
tested in the experimental study. 
Salience of Ethicality 
The ‘self’ is comprised of three major attributes (Baumeister 1998). First, reflexive consciousness, or self-
awareness, allows individuals to turn their attention inwards, in order to construct a concept of 
themselves. Second, is the interpersonal aspect of selfhood, or social context, the tools individuals use to 
relate to others. Finally, third, the executive function, acts as the agent or decision-maker in an individual. 
Without this utility, the self would act as a simple onlooker of surrounding events, individuals would be 
unable to make vows or resolutions, stop themselves from acting on an impulse, or choose to eat or drink 
(Baumeister 1998). 
In order to understand the influence of saliency during ethical decision making (e.g., software piracy) the 
concept of the reflexive consciousness needs to be considered and understood (Gino et al. 2009). In social 
psychology, the theory of self-awareness was formulated by Duval and Wickland (1972). In this seminal 
work, the authors proposed that attention could be focused both inwards, as well as outwards. As a result 
of this inward focus, i.e., self-awareness, individuals create a self-concept, or self-image, of themselves 
that they wish to adhere to (Gino et al. 2009). Within this self-concept, individuals formulate their own 
moral standards that they abide by (Mazar et al. 2008). If an individual fails to adhere to these moral 
standards, he/she experiences cognitive dissonance, and his/her self-image is updated negatively (or 
alternately, the unethical action is mentally re-classified as ethical). Conversely, if an individual follows 
his/her moral codes or internal standards, he/she avoids the need for negative updating of their self-
image, and continues to view himself/herself as being honest. However, if an individual does not pay close 
attention to his/her own internal standards, his/her actions may not adhere to them (Langer 1989). Thus, 
when moral standards are more accessible (i.e.: through salience of ethicality of an act), individuals are 
forced to confront the standards, and are more likely to need to justify their actions to themselves (Mazar 
et al. 2008). Consequently, their behavior is likely to be consistent with their standards. Thus, if the 
ethicality of an act is made more salient, it is predicted that an individual will pay more attention to 
his/her standards in order to avoid conflict with his/her ethical self-image, and therefore, behave more 
rationally and ethically (Baumeister 1998; Schweitzer and Hsee 2002). 
The influence of saliency on ethical behaviors has been reported by Vohs and Schooler (2008). The 
authors showed that priming research subjects has an effect on the tendency of individuals to cheat. 
Individuals primed negatively (to believe in determinism) behaved more dishonestly than their 
counterparts, who were primed positively (to believe in free will). Further, Gino et al. (2009), as well as 
Mazar et al. (2008), in their studies of ethical behavior, demonstrated that as saliency of dishonesty 
increases, cheating decreases. It can be hypothesized that if the act of illegal downloading is made more 
accessible to research participants, by increasing salience of ethicality, participants will behave more 
ethically and pirate less. Thus: 
H1: The number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the high salience condition will be lower 
than the number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the low salience condition. 
Deterrence 
Rational crime theory argues that when an individual is considering an illegal activity, the individual 
engages in a cost-benefit analysis that leads to the decision on whether to commit the act or not (Gino et 
al. 2009; Hill and Kochendorfer 1969; Steininger, Johnson, and Kirts 1964). The decision is based upon 
three factors: the amount gained from the illegal act, expected punishment, and finally, likelihood of being 
caught (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Becker 1968). The last of these three factors is a vital input in 
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deterrence theory, in which it is suggested that sanctions play an important role in maintaining 
conformity in social order (Tittle and Rowe 1973). Leming (1980), as well as Michaels and Miethe (1989) 
found that dishonesty (cheating) was situation specific, and that high risk of detection (high deterrence) 
significantly reduced the incidence of cheating. However, in the majority of software piracy literature, 
deterrence is deemed an ineffective way to curb digital theft. For example, Konstantakis et al. (2010) 
concluded that most users pay little attention to laws, finding them unrealistic and inapplicable. Others 
agree that software piracy poses minimum risk to the perpetrator (Moores et al. 2009; Siponen and 
Vartiainen 2007). However, some researchers continue to find support for the role of deterrence, arguing 
for the need to consider rational crime theory in studies of software piracy. For instance, Moores et al. 
(2009) argue that the fear of legal ramifications is the primary motivating factor against an individual’s 
attitude towards piracy. 
In the environment in which software piracy by individual users occurs, it is generally believed that there 
is very low likelihood of being caught, and if caught, punishment is minimal (Konstantakis et al. 2010; 
Moores et al. 2009; Siponen and Vartiainen 2007). In effect, deterrence is very low or non-existent. On 
the other side, there are also high profile stories of individuals who have been prosecuted for music piracy 
(Hardigree 2010). Thus, it could be argued that while software piracy by individuals is usually ignored by 
publishers and law enforcement agencies, there is always possibility that an individual may be prosecuted 
(an element of uncertainty about apprehension and punishment) which may deter some individuals from 
engaging in piracy. Thus, it is argued: 
H2: The number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the low deterrence condition will be 
higher than the number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the uncertain deterrence 
condition. 
Social Influence 
Researchers have shown that social norms account for much of human behavior (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, 
Kallgren 1990). Bandura (1965) demonstrated that children exposed to an aggressive model displayed 
more aggressive behavior towards a doll than children not exposed to such a model. Hicks (1968), as well 
as Siegel and Kohn (1959), corroborated these findings, and further established that disapproving actions 
of an adult also influence aggressive behavior in children. Children exposed to aggression, as well as a 
disapproving adult, demonstrated less aggression than those children that were not. These comments 
evaluating the behavior of said children are interpreted by the children as a form of social norm. Despite 
such findings of the role of social norms on ethical behaviors, social norms are an understudied area in 
software piracy research (Nill, Schibrowsky, and Peltier 2010; Yi, Xu, and Heales 2013). 
An individual’s primary motivation behind any action is to act in a manner that achieves set goals in the 
most effective manner possible (Cialdini and Trost 1998). Within this effort to maximize the effectiveness 
of the decision making process, individuals rely on two types of social norms: descriptive and injunctive 
norms. Festinger (1954), in his seminal paper on the theory of social comparison processes describes the 
first of these, descriptive norms, as the behavior usually displayed by a reference group regarding an 
unclear decision. These descriptive norms ‘describe’ a behavior, or action. Injunctive norms, the second of 
the two types of social norms, prescribe behavior (Cialdini et al. 1990; Cialdini and Trost 1998; Reno, 
Cialdini, and Kallgren 1993). Injunctive norms characterize the moral rules of a group, i.e.,what should 
(and should not) be done when confronted by a decision. Cialdini et al. (1990) further explain the two 
separate types of social norms as the former being what ‘is’ typically done, while the latter being what 
‘ought’ be done in a given circumstance. These disparate types of norms form the basis of Cialdini et al.’s 
(1990) focus theory of normative conduct. Within this theory, a specific social context is what determines 
which of these two types of norms individuals adhere to. For example, the authors found that in a pro-
littering (dirty) environment, individuals viewing a confederate litter would litter more than in an anti-
littering (clean) environment. 
In addition to the focus theory of normative conduct, the degree to which individual’s identify with people 
in their surroundings also greatly influences behavior (Gino et al. 2009). Wenzel (2004) verified that 
social norms greatly influence the behavior of those that identify strongly with the group to which the 
norms are attributed. These findings are explained by Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory 
(Gino et al. 2009; Rubin and Hewstone 1998). When an in-group member engages in unethical behavior, 
descriptive norms are utilized, and the action is accepted as the norm to emulate. On the other hand, 
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when an out-group member engages in the same unethical behavior, the injunctive norm takes over, and 
non-group members attempt to distance themselves from the ‘bad apple’ (Gino et al. 2009). 
In previous literature, most researchers assume that social norms surrounding software piracy are pro-
piracy, particularly in student communities (Cronan, Foltz, and Jones 2006; Gopal and Sanders 1998; Nill 
et al. 2010; Woolley and Eining 2006). Thus, for an in-group confederate influencing subjects with 
unethical behavior, it is hypothesized: 
H3a: The number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the negative social influence condition 
will be higher than the number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the condition when there is 
no social influence. 
For an in-group confederate influencing the subjects with ethical behavior, it is hypothesized: 
H3b: The number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the positive social influence condition 
will be lower than the number of individuals engaging in software piracy in the condition when there is 
no social influence. 
In the next section, details of the experimental design are provided. 
Experimental Design 
In the current section, we provide key details of the experimental design: an overview of the task, the 
treatments, the planned comparisons, some key experimental design issues, and the variables. 
Overview of the Task 
Groups of eight to twelve subjects will perform a task at the same time, independent of each other, in a 
computer laboratory under controlled conditions. Each subject is required to acquire a software program 
from an online site for a class. The primary dependent variable of interest is the mode of software 
acquisition: purchase or pirate. Subjects will be provided the uniform resource locator (URL) of a 
purchase website, built for the study, from which to acquire the software program. When subjects access 
the website to acquire the software, in addition to information from the legitimate website, they will see a 
large advertisement from another website, evidently a pirate site, which offers the same software for free. 
At the start of the session, each subject will be provided a gift card (prepaid debit card) with a $20 value 
on it. Subjects will be informed that the $20 is partly compensation for their participation, and partly to 
defray the cost of software, which is about $10. They will be told that the value remaining on the card at 
the end of the session is theirs to keep. Thus, there is actual money at stake for the subjects. 
Immediately before subjects make a decision, one of the subjects, a confederate actor, will make specific 
statements, the statements being different for each treatment. The same confederate actor will participate 
in each of the treatment sessions. Each statement constitutes the experimental manipulation for a session, 
which will be discussed further under the subsection ‘Treatments’. Following the manipulations, subjects 
will make their decision, and then complete questionnaires (which will include items for manipulation 
checks, demographics, and other individual characteristics). 
Treatments 
There are three variables that are being manipulated by the treatments: salience of unethicality of pirating 
(low or high), deterrence (uncertain or low), and social influence (none, negative, or positive). In each 
treatment, more than one variable may be manipulated. The effects of individual antecedent variables will 
be teased out by performing planned comparisons in the statistical analysis phase. The five treatment 
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Table 1. Treatment Groups 
The manipulations during treatments involve statements made by the confederate actor, and the response 
given by the research assistant conducting the session. Table 2. shows the manipulations, i.e., the verbal 
exchange between the confederate and research assistant conducting the study, and also the resulting 
values of the three variables of interest. 
Treatment Salience Deterrence Social Influence Manipulation 
1 Low Uncertain Low 
Confederate: (makes no 
statement) 
Research Assistant: (stays 
silent) 
2 High Uncertain Low 
Confederate: “Hey, did you all see 
this link to the site where you can 
pirate the software for free? If we 
click it, we can keep all of our 20 
dollar gift card!” 
Research Assistant: “Please do not 
disturb the others. You should 
complete the task in silence.” 
3 High Low Low 
Confederate: “Hey, did you all see 
this link to the site where you can 
pirate the software for free? If we 
click it, we can keep all of our 20 
dollar gift card!” 
Research Assistant: “Please do not 
disturb the others. You should 
complete the task in silence.” 
Confederate: “Can we get the 
software from there?” 
Research Assistant: “Sure, if you 
want to. Now please do not disturb 
the others.” 
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Confederate: “Hey, did you all see 
this link to the site where you can 
pirate the software for free? If we 
click it, we can keep all of our 20 
dollar gift card!” 
Research Assistant: “Please do not 
disturb the others. You should 
complete the task in silence.” 
Confederate: “I am going to get it 
from that site for free!” 
Research Assistant: “Please do not 
disturb the others.” 





Confederate: “Hey, did you all see 
this link to the site where you can 
pirate the software for free? If we 
click it, we can keep all of our 20 
dollar gift card!” 
Research Assistant: “Please do not 
disturb the others. You should 
complete the task in silence.” 
Confederate: “No, that would be 
wrong. I will not get it from there!” 
Research Assistant: “Please do not 
disturb the others.” 
Table 2. Manipulations for Each Treatment 
The first treatment condition is the control condition, in which the confederate actor will be present, but 
will not say anything. In this treatment, the effect of the manipulation on each of the three variables is as 
follows. The salience of piracy is low, since no one has pointed out the presence of the ability to pirate the 
software. Deterrence is uncertain, since the likelihood of getting caught if they pirate the software, or the 
consequences if they get caught, has not been discussed with the subjects. Lastly, there is no social 
influence, as the confederate says nothing. 
In the second treatment condition, the saliency condition, the confederate actor makes the unethicality of 
the free download link more salient for the rest of the group (see Table 2.). Thus the salience of the 
unethicality of the free download is high. The deterrence level is uncertain because subjects do not know if 
it is permissible to download from the free website, or if there will be negative consequences if they do. 
Subjects will not be aware of the actual download decision of the confederate actor, thus there is no social 
influence. 
In the third treatment condition, the deterrence condition, there are two interactions between the 
confederate and the research assistant. In the first interaction, the salience of the unethicality of the free 
download is raised. The second part of the interaction removes/reduces the uncertainty associated with 
the possibility of consequences for getting the software from the free download site. The RA’s response, 
“sure if you want to,” reassures the subjects that there will be no consequence if they pirate, i.e., 
deterrence becomes low (or non-existent) in this condition. Subjects in the session are unaware of the site 
from which the confederate actor is acquiring the software, and thus are not influenced by the 
confederate’s behavior, i.e., social influence is low or not present. 
In the fourth treatment condition, the negative social influence condition, the first part of the 
manipulation enhances the salience of the unethicality of downloading from the pirate site. The 
consequences of acquiring software from the pirate site are not addressed, so deterrence is uncertain. In 
the second part of the interaction, the confederate actor loudly states that he intends to acquire software 
from the pirate site, so unethical social influence is high. 
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In the fifth, and final, treatment condition, the positive social influence condition, the first part of the 
manipulation enhances the salience of the unethicality of downloading from the pirate site. The 
consequences of acquiring software from the pirate site are not addressed, so deterrence is uncertain. In 
the second part of the interaction, the confederate actor loudly states that he does not intend to acquire 
software from the pirate site, so ethical social influence is high. 
Planned Comparisons 
The goal of the study is to understand the influence of four factors on the ethical behavior of subjects: 
salience, deterrence, unethical social influence, and ethical social influence. The values of each of these 
variables for each treatment are shown in Table 2. The effect of each variable can be determined by 
making the appropriate planned comparison. 
• Effect of Salience: Comparison of treatments 1 (Low Salience) and 2 (High Salience), with the values of 
deterrence and social influence remaining constant 
• Effect of Deterrence: Comparison of treatments 2 (Uncertain Deterrence) and 3 (Low/No Deterrence), 
with the values of salience and social influence remaining constant 
• Effect of Negative Social Influence: Comparison of treatments 2 (No social influence) and 4 (High 
Unethical Social Influence), with the values of salience and deterrence remaining constant 
• Effect of Positive Social Influence: Comparison of treatments 2 (No Social Influence) and 5 (High 
Ethical Social Influence), with the values of salience and deterrence remaining constant 
Key Issues in Experimental Design 
The experiment has been designed to maximize internal validity. Some key issues are mentioned. 
To avoid social desirability bias, subjects must feel reassured that the researchers cannot tell if the subject 
pirated or not, i.e., actions of the subjects must be confidential. Subjects pick a gift card at random from a 
bowl at the beginning of the study. The last four digits of the gift card serve as the identification number of 
the subject for the study. Since, there is no record of which subject picked which gift card, the researchers 
have no way of discovering which individual pirated, and which did not. Further, the use of an electronic 
gift card masks if the subjects are walking out with $10 or $20, thus reassuring subjects that the research 
assistant cannot tell if the subjects pirated or not. 
A second issue that is critical is the timing of the manipulation – it has to be done before the subject 
makes the decision to buy or pirate. This proves tricky as each subject in a session may proceed at a 
different speed. To avoid this, the research assistant guides all subjects in a session step-by-step to the 
point where they have to enter the URL to access the website. Only then is the URL address shared with 
the subjects. Subjects are allowed about 30 seconds (the optimal time will be determined in pre-tests) to 
come to the point of the decision, at which time the confederate actor will speak up as required by the 
manipulation. 
A third issue is the choice of the confederate actor. For the use of the confederate to be effective, he/she 
must blend in, yet at the same time, the presence of the confederate in multiple sessions may be noticed 
and raise questions. This is being managed by using a student from a neighboring university, who can 
blend in, but at the same time will not be known to the other subjects, reducing the likelihood that the 
confederate will be noticed. 
Variables and Measures 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable being measured in the study is the respondents’ software acquisition choice. This 
is a binary response: purchase from the legal site, or pirate from the illegal site. When the subject 
purchases from the legal website, he/she will enter her gift card number, which will be captured in a 
database. The presence of the gift card number in the database yields the value “purchased from legal 
site,” and the absence of the card number yields the value “acquired from pirate site.” 
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Independent Variables 
Three independent variables are being manipulated across the five treatment groups in order to tease out 
a change in software acquisition choice, as follows: 
• Saliency of Ethicality of Act, referred to as Saliency (values are: Low or High) 
• Deterrence (values are: Uncertain or Low) 
• Social Influence Conditions (values are: None, High Unethical Influence, High Ethical Influence) 
Manipulation Checks 
Items will be included to examine if the manipulations were interpreted by subjects as intended by the 
researchers. 
Concluding Remarks 
Understanding the factors that influence software piracy continues to be a challenge both because of its 
potential economic consequences, and because of its ethical implications. Such understanding will elude 
researchers until they are able to comprehend the role of social desirability bias in the participants of 
study. In the experiment being considered, the likelihood of bias is reduced by placing actual money at 
stake. Deterrence and social influence have been considered key explanatory factors of software piracy, 
and have received some attention in prior research. On the other hand, salience of ethicality at the 
moment of piracy has never been considered. The empirical evidence from the current study is expected 
to further the field’s understanding of factors that motivate software piracy, and bring to light new 
experimental methods to conduct more valid research on the topic. 
References 
Allingham, M. G., and Sandmo, A. 1972. “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis,” Journal of Public 
Economics (1), pp. 323–338. 
Bandura, A. 1965. “Influence of Models’ Reinforcement Contingencies on the Acquisition of Imitative 
Responses,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1:6), pp. 589–595.  
Baumeister, R. F. 1998. “The Self,” in Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume One, D. T. Gilbert, S. T. 
Fiske, and G. Lindzey (eds.), New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 680–740. 
Becker, G. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy (76:2), 
pp. 169–217. 
Cheng, H. K., Sims, R. R., and Teegen, H. 1997. “To Purchase or to Pirate Software: An Empirical Study,” 
Journal of Management Information Systems (13:4), pp. 49–60. 
Chung, J., and Monroe, G. S. 2003. “Exploring Social Desirability Bias,” Journal of Business Ethics 
(44:4), pp. 291–302. 
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., and Kallgren, C. A. 1990. “A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling 
the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology (58:6), pp. 1015–1026.  
Cialdini, R., and Trost, M. 1998. “Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity and Compliance,” in 
Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume One, D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (eds.), New 
York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 151– 192. 
Cronan, T. P., Foltz, C. B., and Jones, T. W. 2006. “Piracy, Computer Crime, and IS Misuse at the 
University,” Communications of the ACM (49:6), pp. 85–90.  
Duval, S. and Wicklund, R.A. 1972. A Theory of Objective Self-Awareness, New York: Academic Press.  
Festinger, L. 1954. “A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,” Human Relations (7:2), pp. 117–140.  
Gino, F., Ayal, S., and Ariely, D. 2009. “Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior: The Effect of 
One Bad Apple on the Barrel,” Psychological Science (20:3), pp. 393–8.  
Gopal, R. D., and Sanders, G. L. 1998. “International Software Piracy: Analysis of Key Issues and 
Impacts,” Information Systems Research (9:4), pp. 380–397. 
Hardigree, M. 2010. “How the RIAA Took My Vintage Mustang,” Jalopnik.com.  
Hicks, D. J. 1968. “Effects of Co-Observer’s Sanctions and Adult Presence on Imitative Aggression,” Child 
Development (39:1), pp. 303–309. 
 Antecedents of Software Piracy 
 Twentieth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Savannah, 2014 9 
Hill, J. P., and Kochendorfer, R. A. 1969. “Knowledge of Peer Success and Risk of Detection as 
Determinants of Cheating,” Developmental Psychology (1:3), pp. 231–238. 
Konstantakis, N. I., Palaigeorgiou, G. E., Siozos, P. D., & Tsoukalas, I. A. 2010. “What Do Computer 
Science Students Think About Software Piracy?,” Behaviour & Information Technology (29:3), pp. 
277–285. 
Langer, E. 1989. “Minding Matters: The Consequences of Mindlessness-Mindfulness,” Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (22), pp. 137-173.  
Leming, J. S. 1980. “Cheating Behavior, Subject Variables, and Components of the Internal-External Scale 
Under High and Low Risk Conditions,” Journal of Educational Research (74:2), pp. 83–87. 
Mazar, N., Amir, O., and Ariely, D. 2008. “The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept 
Maintenance,” Journal of Marketing Research (45), December, pp. 633–644. 
Michaels, J., and Miethe, T. 1989. “Applying Theories of Deviance to Academic Cheating,” Social Science 
Quarterly (70:4), pp. 870–885. 
Moores, T. T., Nill, A., and Rothenberger, M. A. 2009. “Knowledge of Software Piracy as an Antecedent to 
Reducing Pirating Behavior,” Journal of Computer Information Systems (50:1), pp. 82–89. 
Nill, A., Schibrowsky, J., and Peltier, J. 2010. “Factors that Influence Software Piracy: A View from 
Germany,” Communications of the ACM (53:6), pp. 131–134.  
Paulhus, D. L. 2002. “Socially Desirable Responding: The Evolution of a Construct,” in The Role of 
Constructs in Psychological and Educational Measurement, H. I. Braun, D. N. Jackson, and D. E. 
Wiley (eds.), Mahwah: Erlbaum, pp. 49-69. 
Reno, R. R., Cialdini, R. B., and Kallgren, C. A. 1993. “The Transsituational Influence of Social Norms,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (64:1), pp. 104–112. 
Rubin, M., and Hewstone, M. 1998. “Social Identity Theory’s Self-Esteem Hypothesis: A Review and Some 
Suggestions for Clarification,” Personality and Social Psychology Review (2:1), pp. 40–62. 
Schweitzer, M., and Hsee, C. 2002. “Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification and Motivated 
Communication of Uncertain Information,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (25:2), pp. 185–201. 
Siegel, A., and Kohn, L. 1959. “Permissiveness, Permission, and Aggression: The Effect of Adult Presence 
or Absence on Aggression in Children’s Play,” Child Development (30:1), pp. 131–141. 
Siponen, M. T., and Vartiainen, T. 2007. “Unauthorized Copying of Software: An Empirical Study of 
Reasons for and Against,” SIGCAS Computers and Society (37:1), pp. 30–43. 
Steininger, M., Johnson, R., and Kirts, D. 1964. “Cheating on College Examinations as a Function of 
Situationally Aroused Anxiety And Hostility,” Journal of Educational Psychology (56:6), pp. 317–
324. 
Tajfel, H., and Turner, J. 1979. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology 
of Intergroup Relations, W. G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds.), Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole, pp. 33–47. 
Tittle, C., and Rowe, A. 1973. “Moral Appeal, Sanction Threat, and Deviance: An Experimental Test,” 
Social Problems (20:4), pp. 488–498. 
Vohs, K. D., and Schooler, J. W. 2008. “The Value of Believing in Free Will,” Psychological Science (19:1), 
pp. 49–54. 
Wenzel, M. 2004. “An Analysis of Norm Processes in Tax Compliance,” Journal of Economic Psychology 
(25:2), pp. 213–228. 
Woolley, D. J., and Eining, M. M. 2006. “Software Piracy Among Accounting Students: A Longitudinal 
Comparison of Changes and Sensitivity,” Journal of Information Systems (20:1), pp. 49–63. 
Yi, Z., Xu, D., and Heales, J. 2013. “The Moderating Effect of Social Influence on Ethical Decision Making 
in Software Piracy,” in Proceedings of the Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Jeju 
Island, South Korea. 
